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GORDON LINKON
state criminal trials have been deemed violations of due process. 37 But in
determining questions of this nature, the Court has repeatedly stated that a
state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its
own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.38 Applying this doctrine to the liberal rule
here in question, it seems unlikely that the court will reverse the Illinois
decision. In view of the many state decisions following the rule, one can
hardly say that its application offends a principle of justice "rooted" in
our society.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Thirty Day Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fine Applicable to Period of
Parole-When a poor convict, sentenced to be imprisoned and pay a fine
has been confined in prison thirty days, solely for the nonpayment of such
fine, he may make application to a United States commissioner to take a
pauper's oath; and upon taking it, he is relieved of the fine and discharged.
18 U.S.C.A. §3569 (1948). The United States Board of Parole of the Depart-
ment of Justice had for many years construed this section as permitting a
paroled prisoner who was sentenced to both a prison term and a committed
fine, to serve on parole the thirty additional days necessary to qualify him
to take the poor convict's oath. In United States v. Gottfried, 197 F.2d 239
(2d Cir. 1952), the United States attorney challenged this construction and
took the position that during the additional thirty days the poor convict
must be actually "confined in prison." The court agreed with the Parole
Board's construction. The court, construing the words "confined in prison"
in connection with the Parole Act, held that the parole merely enlarged the
confines of his prison but still left him within the legal custody and under
the control of the Attorney General as if he were physically within the
prison.
Irregularities in Selecting Grand Jury as a Ground for New Trial-In
Rudd v. State, 107 N.E.2d 168 (Ind. 1952), the court held that non-com-
pliance with statutes governing the selection and summoning of grand juries
was sufficient ground for abating an indictment returned by the grand jury.
The indictment was in three counts charging the defendant with murder in
the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.
After the trial court overruled his plea in abatement, defendant entered a
plea of not guilty to each of the three counts. At the trial defendant was
found guilty of murder in the second degree. The issue on appeal was
whether violations of several statutes prescribing the duties of the jury com-
missioner and the clerk harmed the defendant's substantial rights. IND.
CODE ANN §4-3320 (Burns 1946 Replacement). There was no evidence of
bad faith, fraud, or corruption in any of the acts or omissions of the clerk'
or either jury commissioner. The evidence showed noncompliance with
37. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (failure to appoint counsel); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1947) (secret trial in which judge acting as a "one-man grand jury" con-
victed defendant of contempt.)
3S. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
39. Note 5, supra.
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statutes providing for keeping the jury box locked, the selection and placing
of names in the jury box, the drawing of names for jury service, and the
calling of such persons for jury service. The state claimed the acts or omis-
sions in question were mere irregularities, and that, therefore, the trial court
properly refused to abate the indictment. But the court reversed on the
grounds that the indictment was objected to promptly and, more important,
that since there was not a substantial compliance with the statutes on grand
juries, the substantial rights of the defendant were harmed.
Congressman Receiving Political Contribution from Government Employee-
In Brehm v. United States, 196 F.2d 769 (D.C. 1952), a Representative in
Congress from Ohio was convicted of receiving a contribution for political
purposes from one of his employees. 18 U.S.C.A. §602 (1948). Brehm pre-
sented three major contentions on appeal. His first contention was that the
Government failed to prove that the contributions received were used in
financing his own campaign for reelection. The court agreed that it would
make a difference whether the money were used for his own political purposes
or whether the money were used for the political purposes of the national
committee or the state committee, but that the jury might reasonably have
concluded that when he had received the money he had in mind his own
campaign for reelection. Brehm's second contention was that before there
could be a verdict of guilty the jury must find that the giver and the receiver
both knew and understood that the contributions were made for the political
purpose charged. The court 'denied this contention, pointing out that only
the receiver's knowledge and understanding is important. The third point
raised was that the court erred in admitting evidence of offenses not alleged
in the indictment and which had no connection with the offense charged. The
Government had been permitted to introduce evidence of similar contribu-
tions from other employees in previous years. The court pointed out that
this evidence was admissible to establish a common scheme or purpose so
associated with the offense charged that proof of one tends to prove the other,
that both were connected to a single purpose. On all the evidence the con-
viction was sustained.
Arson: Prima Facie Case Coupled with Accused's Failure to Testify-In
State v. Nelson, 90 A.2d 157 (Conn. 1952), the defendant's summer cottage
was set on fire. The cottage was a one story building having a basement and
an attic. The fire was clearly of an incendiary origin because it had been
started in three places: the attic, the kitchen cupboard on the main floor,
and the basement. In close proximity to these places were several open
bottles of gasoline. The defendant had sole access to the cottage and he
admitted to the police that although he had been at his cottage on the day
of the fire he was not there when the fire started. However, he had been seen
in the area at that approximate time. There was no evidence that the cottage
had been broken into prior to the arrival of the firemen. The defendant
offered no evidence and did not testify on his own behalf. In arriving at its
conclusion that the defendant was guilty, the court stated that the evidence
produced by the state was sufficient to suggest the need of some denial or
explanation by the defendant himself. It indicated that the fire was in-
cendiary, that he was on the scene at the time the fire started, that he had
access to the interior and the fire could only be started by someone who had
access without breaking in, that there was a possible motive in that the fire
1952]
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
would permit him to collect some ready money from his insurance. The court
pointed out that these facts taken together made out a prima facie case and
with this as background, it is entitled to draw an inference of guilt from the
defendant's failure to testify. The court held that the prima facie case
coupled with the inference of guilt from the defendant's failure to testify
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Illegal Practice of Law-In Lowe v. Presley, 71 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. 1952), the
defendant, Presley, who was not an attorney-at-law, advised the plaintiff to
plead guilty to an indictment for wilful evasion of Federal income taxes
and, after sentence had been imposed, appeared for Lowe and made a
motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. The court held this to be an unau-
thorized practice of law and subjected him to a fine of $500.00. GA. CODE
ANN. §§9-402, 9-9903 (1931). Presley represented himself as being qualified
to handle all phases necessary in the preparation, counseling, and the defense
of the tax case with respect to all auditing work as well as all legal repre-
sentation necessary. In fact, Presley was not qualified to represent anyone
before the Treasury Department; he had no formal training as an account-
ant; he was not a certified public accountant; and he lacked any type of
accounting experience sufficien to have qualified him to audit the plaintiff's
accounts in order to defend the tax case and to advise the plaintiff as to
the amount of tax he might owe. The court had no difficulty deciding that
Presley's actions amounted to an unauthorized practice of law.
In Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Miss. 1952), the problem becomes
more difficult. Here a licensed real estate broker was charged with contempt
of the authority of the court for the illegal practice of law. As a real estate
broker, Criger had used the standardized forms of warranty deed, quit
claim deed, trust deed, etc. He had also given advice as to legal rights of
parties, effect of instruments, and validity of titles. It was contended that
Criger charged for these services when not acting as the broker or as a
party to the contract. The court phrased the issue of unlawful practice of
law in terms of whether under the circumstances the preparation of deeds,
leases, etc. were the primary business being carried on or whether it were
ancillary to an essential part of another business. Bearing on this issue
were questions of the simplicity or complexity of the forms, the nature and
customs of the main business involved, and the convenience to the public.
The court concluded that a real estate broker may use approved standardized
forms in transactions in which he is acting as a broker, but that he may not
give opinions or advice as to legal rights, nor may he use the forms in
transactions where he is not acting as the broker, nor may he make a separate
charge for completing any standardized forms. Criger was fined one dollar
and ordered to stop the practice held to be improper.
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